The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade from The English Historical Review, October 1915 — A Closer Reading
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Read on Project GutenbergAlbert Howe Lybyer opens his 1915 article by stating a precise chronological frame: the Ottoman Turks extended their control across the Levant from the late thirteenth century to the second decade of the sixteenth, eventually intercepting all great East-West trade routes. He immediately identifies a historiographical dispute: one view holds that Ottoman advance blocked ancient routes and forced the search for new ones; the other finds little connection between Turkish growth and the great discoveries. Lybyer declares the evidence overwhelmingly favors the second view, then proposes to survey oriental trade from the Crusades to the eighteenth century to show the Turks' influence as it emerged historically.
Two Competing Views on Trade Diversion
Lybyer presents two incompatible explanations for why oriental trade shifted from Levantine routes to the Cape of Good Hope around 1500. The first holds that Ottoman power gradually blocked the ancient trade-routes, compelling Europeans to discover new ones and then continue using them because the Turks obstructed the old. The second view, which Lybyer endorses, argues that motives independent of the Turks—such as those of Henry of Portugal and Columbus—led to exploration, and the new route proved essentially superior for trade until steam navigation and the Suez Canal shifted the balance again in the nineteenth century. He does not argue the question directly but instead surveys the historical emergence of Ottoman influence.
Medieval Trade Routes and Turkish Interception
Lybyer describes two groups of medieval trade routes: a northern group passing mainly by land through the Black Sea and Asia Minor, and a southern group passing mainly by sea through Syria and Egypt. As Ottoman power expanded, it came to intercept all these routes. He notes that within two hundred years, Turkish holdings stretched from the Russian steppes to the Sudanese desert. The timing is crucial: near the moment Turkish control became complete, the Portuguese discovered the Cape route, and within a few years most through trade between Europe and Asia had deserted the Levant. Lybyer's diction is precise, using phrases like 'intercept all the great routes' and 'deserted the Levantine routes' to frame the shift as a consequence of competition rather than blockage.
Price Evidence and the Absence of Turkish Obstruction
Lybyer marshals price data to challenge the blockage narrative. He presents average spice prices for the first two decades of the sixteenth century, showing they were slightly below the average for the previous two centuries, with the lowest prices occurring in the second quarter of the fifteenth century. He argues that if the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 had closed Levantine routes, spice prices would have risen markedly between 1453 and 1498, which they did not. He also notes that it was not Mediterranean agencies but Atlantic powers with no relation to the Levant that sought new routes. The evidence suggests that the Turks did not obstruct trade; rather, the Cape route offered essential superiority.
Ottoman Commercial Policy and Continuity
Lybyer cites multiple sources to show that the Ottomans continued Mameluke commercial policies, renewing treaties with Venice after conquering Egypt in 1517. He quotes Paruta that Sultan Selim 'desired the friendship of the Venetians and sought to increase trade.' He notes that the Turks never required double duties on merchandise transported between provinces, and penalties for false declarations were correction, not confiscation. These details indicate a pragmatic approach to trade rather than obstruction. Lybyer's use of primary sources like Heyd, Savary, and Zinkeisen grounds his argument in documentary evidence, showing that Ottoman rule did not sever commercial ties but maintained them under new administration.
Lybyer's article is a model of evidence-based revisionism. He does not deny that Ottoman expansion coincided with the shift in trade routes, but he demonstrates through price averages, treaty renewals, and commercial regulations that the Turks did not actively block commerce. Readers should attend to his careful use of primary sources and his insistence on distinguishing coincidence from causation. The article rewards those who follow his footnotes and weigh the data he presents.
That October afternoon, rain ticking the window, I kept returning to Lybyer’s stubborn insistence that the old routes never truly closed—just quietly outclassed. It made me think of lives proceeding regardless, couriers and merchants unbothered by grand narratives. Hours later, I found myself in Chaucer and His England — Edition Insights, watching another world hum along, equally unconcerned with why everyone thought it mattered.
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